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theoretic concepts in the theory of investment. It is argued that such an approach is often 
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theory of investment, this line of work may be seen as an extension of the theory of 
industrial organization towards the direction that views market stability as one of the 
factors explaining rational behaviour of the firms. 
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1 Introduction 
There is an international movement towards the liberalization of energy markets. Particularly in 
the electricity sector, major structural changes have been taking place since the beginning of 
the 1990's, some of the pioneering countries being the United Kingdom, Chile, New Zealand, 
the Nordic countries, and some states of the USA. Also the European Union has adopted 
directives to open up markets for electricity and natural gas (directives 96/92/EC and 
98/30/EC). While the reforms vary across countries, the common tendency is to move from 
regulated monopolies towards competition and market-based pricing. The main motivation is 
the effort to improve the economic efficiency. 
This restructuring trend has brought out a lot of challenging research topics. In electricity 
markets, the focus has been on the short-term functioning of the markets.1 Only recently, the 
long-term issues, particularly capital investments, have started to gain attention. As the markets 
are liberalized, also the investment decisions are increasingly made by firms whose objective is 
to maximize their market values. Some of the topics of interest are whether a sufficient reserve 
capacity is ensured, and how the competitiveness of different sources of energy supply relative 
to each other is affected by the changing industry structure. 
Concurrent with the liberalization movement, the energy industry faces a major challenge, 
namely the increasing concern of the environmental impacts of energy production. The most 
alarming issue is the global warming caused by the emission of greenhouse gases, in particular 
carbon dioxide. To manage to reduce these emissions without considerably reducing the 
energy consumption requires a substantial change in the build-up of the existing production 
capacity. There is pressure on one hand for shutting down old fossil fueled capacity, and on the 
other hand for building new capacity based on renewable technologies.2 Thus, the investment 
and shut-down decisions of the firms acting in the liberalized energy markets have also a major 
importance with respect to the achievement of globally acknowledged policy goals. 
The literature on energy production investments has traditionally been based on the paradigms 
of optimization and planning (see, e.g., Chao, 1983, Sherali et al., 1984, He and David, 1995, 
for individual contributions, or Kahn, 1988, for a broader treatment). However, the relevance of 
this literature is depreciating as the markets are being liberalized. Instead of optimizing the 
capacity expansion from the perspective of the society, the new organization of the industry 
stresses the optimal design of the market rules (see Chao and Huntington, 1998, for topics on 
the design of electricity markets). In order to account for the long-term objectives in such 
design, one should have a proper understanding of the investment behavior of the value 
maximizing market participants. One purpose of this thesis is to shed light on some issues 
related to investment and the choice of production technologies under such circumstances. 
Since capacity investments are irreversible decisions with long-term consequences, different 
uncertainties are critical determinants of the firms' investment behavior. This is the viewpoint 
emphasized in the modern economic theory regarding investment. This real options approach 
                                                      
1 Among the main issues of concern have been the possible exercise of market power by dominant companies 
(e.g. Andersson and Bergman, 1995, Jing-Yuan and Smeers, 1999, and Borenstein et al., 1999), the functioning of 
the power exchanges (e.g. Bolle, 1992, Green and Newbery, 1992, and von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993), and the 
effect of the physical network on the trade and incentives (e.g. Chao and Peck, 1996, Hogan, 1997, 1998, Oren, 
1997, and Stoft, 1999). 
2 Another motivation for this is the increasing concern of dependence on imported energy sources, see, e.g., 
European Commission (2001). 
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has its foundations in the field of financial economics and it stresses the analogy between 
financial derivative instruments and physical investment opportunities. In dynamically evolving 
energy markets, where the values of production assets are contingent on uncertain factors 
such as input and output prices, the optimal investment decisions and valuation of assets 
require that kind of methodology. 
However, there are also many fundamental differences between physical investment 
opportunities in energy markets and financial derivative instruments. To have a proper 
understanding of the investment in realistic settings, the specific properties of the industry must 
be incorporated into the theory. A characteristic feature of energy production is that there are 
many alternative technologies available with different properties in terms of the cost structure 
and associated uncertainties. Some projects are site-specific, e.g., hydro power and 
transmission capacity investments, in which cases there are rents associated with the 
investment opportunities. On the other hand, for thermal plants, for instance, the particular site 
is not the most determining factor, and thus the rents are subject to competition in the output 
market. Some technologies allow capacity investment in small units (e.g. natural gas and 
biomass fired plants and wind turbines), while others must be added in large lumps where even 
a single investment may have an influence on all market participants through the effect in 
market price (e.g. nuclear plants). The shut-down of production units should also be seen as an 
investment, where the initial expenditure of the shut-down costs are considered against the 
payoff of future avoided losses. This is relevant in connection with closing fossil fueled 
production in response to environmental policy measures. 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of energy investments in comparison to financial 
investments is the competitive interaction. All energy investments are at least to some degree 
interlinked through the output price determined by industry demand and supply. In cases where 
there are only a relatively small number of actors, strategic interactions must be accounted for. 
This is also important with network investments, such as power and natural gas transmission. 
For the modeling of such interactions, game theoretic concepts must be incorporated into the 
theory of investment. 
This thesis has two main themes. First, it contributes to the development of the theory of 
investment under uncertainty. In particular, a major part is devoted to the incorporation of 
strategic interactions with this theory. Second, it presents applications that focus on specific 
settings in energy markets with the emphasis on uncertainties and the timing of investment. 
The present introductory article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the modern theory of 
investment under uncertainty and places the articles of this thesis within the literature. Section 
3 reviews the thesis and states the contribution of each individual article. Section 4 concludes. 
2 Modern theory of investment under uncertainty 
2.1 Foundations 
The elementary corporate finance theory says that an investment project should be undertaken 
whenever its net present value is positive. The neoclassical theory of investment in the 
economics literature is also based on this rule. However, for the rule to be correct, some 
implicit assumptions must hold: the investment project must be either completely reversible or a 
"now or never" opportunity. Alternatively, its value must be completely independent of any 
observable variables that evolve in time. Nevertheless, in most realistic cases investment 
opportunities are at least to some extent irreversible, and they can be delayed in order to 
receive more information on the underlying uncertain factors that affect their values. Under 
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such conditions, the correct decision involves comparing the value of investing today with the 
value of investing at all possible times in the future. Since the "old" theory ignores this 
comparison of mutually exclusive alternatives, its relevance has been questioned. 
The "new" theory of investment has been developed on the idea of an analogy between 
investment opportunities and financial derivative instruments. Typically, projects are contingent 
on input and output prices that fluctuate in time. Therefore, rather than being fixed, the project 
values evolve dynamically in time. An opportunity to undertake an investment is like a call 
option. Whereas the value of a financial call option depends on the stochastic security prices, 
the value of a real investment opportunity depends on such uncertain factors as input and 
output prices. The main insight is that due to the option value inherent in an investment 
opportunity, it is not optimal to invest until the present value of the expected cash flows 
exceeds the cost of investment by a strictly positive amount to compensate for the loss of the 
option. 
Due to the analogy to pricing derivative instruments, this new theory of irreversible investment 
is also referred to as the real options approach. Its foundations are in the field of financial 
economics. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) developed the theory for the 
valuation of financial derivative instruments whose payoffs are contingent on the values of 
some underlying assets. This led to the equivalent risk neutral valuation formalized in, e.g., Cox 
and Ross (1976), Constantinides (1978), and Harrison and Kreps (1979).  According to this, 
any contingent claim on an asset can be valued consistently by replacing its actual growth rate 
with a certainty equivalent growth rate, and then taking the expectation of the cash flows as if 
the world were risk neutral. In technical terms, this corresponds to presenting the stochastic 
processes under the equivalent martingale measure. 
The first papers applying these insights in physical investment were concerned with individual 
discrete projects. McDonald and Siegel (1985) consider the valuation of an investment project 
contingent on stochastic output price and with the possibility to shut down production whenever 
it is not profitable. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) consider the opening, closing, and 
abandonment decisions involved with a natural resource mine, where the price of the resource 
is stochastic. McDonald and Siegel (1986) consider the optimal timing of investment in a 
project with uncertainty both in the present value and the cost of investment. In these, and in 
most of the subsequent literature, uncertainty is modeled by state variables that follow the 
geometric Brownian motion. The optimal investment rule is expressed as a "threshold" or 
"boundary" in the state space such that the investment occurs when the state variable crosses 
the threshold for the first time. More generally, in such "Markovian" models the solution takes 
the form of a "stopping region", i.e., a region in the state space where it is optimal to invest. 
The incremental capacity investment from the options perspective was first properly treated by 
Pindyck (1988). The paper shows that the firm's capacity choice is optimal when the present 
value of the expected cash flow from a marginal unit of capacity just equals the total cost of that 
unit. Importantly, the cost must include the cost of exercising the option to buy that unit. The 
paper illustrates that the firm's market value has two components: the value of installed 
capacity and the value of the firm's options to add more capacity later. Bertola and Caballero 
(1994) include firm specific uncertainty and consider the effect of irreversibility on the 
aggregate investment dynamics of a large number of individual firms. Dixit (1995) considers the 
effect of scale economies on incremental investment, and analyzes the conditions under which 
it is optimal to add capacity in discrete lumps rather than incremental units. A related literature 
considers adjustment costs, where it is assumed that the cost of changing the capital stock 
depends on the rate of investment. Abel and Eberly (1994) present a unifying model with 
several types of adjustment costs, which also capture the effect of irreversibility characteristic 
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to the real options approach. Abel et al. (1996) link the adjustment cost approach and options 
approach in a simple two period model to clarify their relationship. 
A comprehensive summary of the new investment theory is given in the book by Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). They emphasize throughout the book that there are two alternative techniques 
to derive the optimal investment rule and the value of the investment opportunity. The method 
of contingent claims analysis is more directly based on the financial economics theory, and 
utilizes replicating portfolios and the absence of arbitrage principle. The dynamic programming 
methodology, on the other hand, takes a given discount rate and is formulated as the 
maximization problem of the expected value of discounted cash flows. The methods are linked 
through the equivalent risk netural valuation principle, which says that the dynamic 
programming approach gives the arbitrage-free price for an investment option when the 
stochastic processes are given under the martingale measure and the risk-free rate of return is 
used as the discount factor. 
From the perspective of the dynamic programming approach, the timing of irreversible 
investment is an optimal stopping problem. There is an extensive literature dealing with the 
problem from the mathematical point of view (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998, or 
Øksendal, 2000). Various techniques have been developed to solve different versions of the 
problem. For example, Insley (2002) applies the linear complementarity formulation, while 
Alvarez (1998) applies a Greenian approach based on the theory of linear diffusions and 
potentials. 
As emphasized in the new corporate finance literature, the real options methodology is actually 
applicable more generally in valuing managerial flexibility associated with real assets. 
Examples include Kulatilaka (1988), who considers the valuing of flexible manufacturing 
systems, Triantis and Hodder (1990), who develop a methodology for valuing a production 
system that can be switched to produce different combinations of a number of products, and 
Kulatilaka (1993), who values the flexibility to switch between two fuels associated with an 
industrial steam boiler. 
2.2 Refinements 
Real investment opportunities have often physical characteristics that distinguish them from 
financial derivative instruments. In this section some of the literature that deals with such 
refinements is reviewed. 
Dixit (1989a) extends the problem of timing a discrete investment problem by noting that a 
project can often be abandoned at some cost if it proves to be unprofitable. An example is entry 
and exit of a firm to a new market. There are two interlinked option pricing problems that must 
be solved simultaneously: the firm that is out of the market has an option to enter (or to invest 
in a project), and the firm that is in the business has an option to exit (or to abandon the 
project). 
Often investment opportunities offer the possibility to choose not only the timing, but also the 
scale of the project. This is particularly relevant with site-specific projects, such as land 
development or energy production and transmission. Dixit (1993) allows the choice between a 
number of mutually exclusive projects. Capozza and Li (1994) allow the intensity of investment 
to be a free variable, and study the optimal timing and intensity of land development. The 
papers by Bar-Ilan and Strange (1999) and Dangl (1999) further elaborate the theory. One 
insight common to all these papers is that the greater the uncertainty, the greater the value of 
waiting and the eventual intensity of investment. 
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Physical investment projects are often characterized by considerable lags between initiating the 
project and getting the production on line. Majd and Pindyck (1987) assume a maximum rate of 
construction and allow stopping and restarting of the project until the plant is finished. Pindyck 
(1993a) assumes technical uncertainty over the cost of construction that is resolved as the 
investment proceeds. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) have a fixed time of construction and show 
that the lag has no real effect on the investment decision as long as there is no abandonment 
option, but combined with such an option the conventional effect of uncertainty on investment 
may be weakened or even reversed. Alvarez and Keppo (2002) assume that the investment lag 
is positively related to the underlying revenue process and show that this may lead to multiple 
disjoint price regions where waiting is preferable to investing. 
Many investment projects consist of several stages. Typical examples include research and 
development, market analysis, exploration, applying regulatory approval, and the actual 
construction of the plant. Completing one stage gives an option to proceed to another stage. 
Then, investment opportunities are compound options. Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) have two 
stages, both of which take a fixed time to complete. They show that if it is possible to suspend 
the project, it may be optimal to carry out "exploratory" investment. Weeds (1999) considers a 
two-stage model, where in the first stage the firm conducts research and development in order 
to get a patent, and the second stage is the actual market entry. She shows that it may be 
optimal to suspend the project after the first stage, which results in a sleeping patent. 
Technically the model is very similar to Bar-Ilan and Strange (1998) the main distinctive feature 
being the technological uncertainty over the time to complete the first period. 
While most of the real options literature considers uncertainty in input and output prices, other 
sources of uncertainty are of course possible. Ingersoll and Ross (1992) consider uncertainty in 
interest rates. Dixit (1989b) considers exchange rate uncertainty. Grenadier and Weiss (1997), 
Farzin et al. (1998), and article [I] in this thesis consider uncertainty in the technological 
progress. Depending on the source of uncertainty, other processes than the geometric 
Brownian motion may be more appropriate models. See for example Cox and Ross (1976) for 
the valuation of options under jump processes, or Metcalf and Hassett (1995) for investment 
under mean reverting processes. 
2.3 Rational expectations equilibrium 
The literature reviewed above considers the optimal investment behavior of a firm in isolation 
from competitors. In such a case, there is a rent associated with the option that must result 
from some firm-specific advantages such as patents, ownership of a specific site or natural 
resources, regulatory rules, reputation, etc. However, one of the main characteristics with real 
assets in comparison to financial assets is that there is typically competitive interaction in the 
product market. In the limiting case of completely free entry, the competition should eliminate 
any rents associated with investment opportunities. 
The theory has been extended to the product market equilibrium with industry-wide uncertainty, 
where the industry is assumed to be composed of a large number of agents who produce 
output by means of capital. Any firm can enter by investing in capital at a given cost per unit. 
The price uncertainty is replaced by demand uncertainty, which combined with the firms' 
actions results in an endogenous stochastic price process. Lucas and Prescott (1971) formalize 
the rational expectations equilibrium in such a setting, and establish its social optimality. In 
equilibrium with rational expectations, the resulting probability distribution of the prices must be 
such that no firm that anticipates this distribution correctly has an incentive to change its 
investment behavior. 
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In the framework of irreversible investment, Pindyck (1993b) illustrates the equilibrium in a 
simple two period setting. Leahy (1993) works in continuous time, and discovers that the 
equilibrium timing of the next marginal investment is the same as the optimal timing of 
investment of a myopic firm that ignores the presence of competitors. The intuition is that while 
the competition reduces the value of the investment option, it also reduces the value of the 
installed capacity, and together these effects leave the optimal timing to exercise the option 
unaffected. The result facilitates the computation of the competitive equilibrium, since the 
resulting endogenous price process can be derived by means of the solution of the easier 
problem of the myopic investor. From the perspective of this thesis, it sets the basis for a 
possible extension of the articles [I] and [II] to the industry equilibrium level. 
Leahy's result links the theory of irreversible investment of an isolated firm to the competitive 
equilibrium, and therefore complements the link between equilibrium and social optimum 
established by Lucas and Prescott (1971). The two links together imply also a third link, namely 
the correspondence of the myopic solution and the social optimum. This illustrates that the 
competition in essence transfers the option value of waiting from the firm, which maximizes its 
individual contribution to consumer surplus, to the "social planner", which maximizes aggregate 
consumer surplus. 
Baldursson and Karatzas (1997) generalize and further elaborate the links between social 
optimum, equilibrium, and optimal entry of a myopic investor utilizing singular stochastic control 
theory and its connections with the optimal stopping problem. Grenadier (1999) extends the 
analysis by including investment lags. Tvedt (1999) presents an application in a competitive 
shipping market. 
2.4 Strategic interaction 
Many real markets are characterized by a relatively small number of competing firms. In such 
oligopolistic settings strategic interaction must be explicitly accounted for, which requires a 
game theoretic approach. The combination of game theoretic analysis with the real options 
methodology is currently an active area of theoretical work. A recent book edited by Grenadier 
(2000a) collects some relevant papers. The contributions of this thesis also fall to a large extent 
on this area. 
Since the real options approach to investment under uncertainty is mainly concerned with the 
timing of investment, it is natural that some important background theory can be found in the 
game theoretic models of timing, such as Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Gilbert 
and Harris (1984), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985, 1986), Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985). Even 
more directly related is the literature on stopping games, which are stochastic games where the 
players' strategies are stopping times (e.g. Huang and Li, 1990, Dutta and Rustichini, 1993). A 
related formulation of strategies and the Markov perfect equilibrium can also be found in Dutta 
and Rustichini (1995), who consider a class of continuous time stochastic games in which 
players make discrete changes in variables that affect their payoffs. 
However, some of the basic insights have been elaborated in simple two-period settings. Smit 
and Ankum (1993) model demand evolution with a binomial tree and illustrate different 
outcomes and associated rents in sub-game perfect equilibrium of the resulting extensive form 
entry game. Different outcomes are distinguished on the basis of firm asymmetries and values 
of investment in relation to market uncertainty. Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) model a duopoly, 
where in the first period one of the firms can undertake an irreversible investment that reduces 
its production cost, which is interpreted as a purchase of a growth option. The uncertainty in 
market demand is resolved in the second period and the firms compete in quantities. It is 
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shown that due to the strategic interaction in the product market, the effect of uncertainty on the 
attractiveness of investment is ambiguous. 
Continuous time becomes relevant when one wants to focus explicitly on the timing of the 
investment. Typically, a firm's income flow is modeled as a function of an exogenous state 
variable and the actions of the other firms. Uncertainty is incorporated by letting the state 
variable follow a geometric Brownian motion. In most of the cases considered, strategic 
interaction takes the form of preemptive behavior, where an investment of one firm discourages 
the investment of other firms creating an incentive to act first. Such interaction is typical in entry 
to an emerging market or in the adoption of a new technology. Without competition, the 
investment opportunities would have a positive option value, but preemptive competition 
reduces such rents. How much the rents are dissipated depends on various factors, for 
example the degree of uncertainty, whether the investment opportunity is exclusive (i.e. only 
one firm can invest), whether information is complete or incomplete, and whether firms are 
symmetric or non-symmetric. 
There is a technical matter concerning the possibility of erroneous simultaneous investment. 
The problem arises in moving to continuous time by taking the limit of the discrete time mixed 
strategy equilibrium, as shown in a deterministic setting by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They 
propose a certain kind of an extended strategy space to deal with the problem. In the recent 
real options literature there are different interpretations of an appropriate way to treat the issue. 
Most papers rule out simultaneous entry by identifying two symmetric equilibria where the firms 
are indifferent on the role assignment, or by imposing some random mechanism to choose one 
of the firms in case they try to invest at the same time (e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Grenadier, 
1996, Lambrecht, 1999, Boyer et al., 2001, Weeds, 2002, Lambrecht and Perraudin, 2003). 
Exceptions are Grenadier (2000b) and Huisman and Kort (2000a, 2000b), who allow the mixed 
strategies equilibrium within each infinitesimal time increment, which results in an equilibrium 
where simultaneous entry occurs at some positive probability. 
Some of the models are concerned with an exclusive project such that when one of the firms 
invests, the opportunity is completely lost for the other firms. Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) 
model a duopoly where the firms have incomplete information on each other's investment cost, 
and find that the Bayesian equilibrium investment timing is between the full rent dissipation and 
monopoly cases. Article [III] of this thesis considers an oligopoly with firm specific uncertainty 
with different assumptions on the information that firms have about each other. With complete 
information and symmetry the rent is fully dissipated, but generally the equilibrium investment 
strategy of each firm is between the monopoly and rent dissipation cases. Lambrecht (1999) 
considers a sequential two-stage investment. The first stage is the investment in a patent giving 
the exclusive right to proceed to the second stage. The model assumes that the firms have 
incomplete information on each other's profit parameters, and studies the conditions under 
which a sleeping patent, that is, investment in the patent without proceeding directly to the 
second stage, occurs in the Bayesian equilibrium. 
Models of non-exclusive projects lead usually to sequential investment, or leader-follower 
models. The literature is restricted to duopoly settings, although the extension to oligopolies 
would in some cases be straight-forward. In a proper analysis the roles of the leader and 
follower must be determined endogenously. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 9) present a 
simple model, where there are two potential entrants in a market with stochastically evolving 
demand. In equilibrium one of the firms enters at the moment when both firms are indifferent 
about being the leader or follower. Joaquin and Butler (1999) generalize the model to 
asymmetric costs, which leads to the low-cost firm entering first. Baba (2000) presents an 
application of a similar model to the Japanese loan market.  
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Some models have an equilibrium with simultaneous investment in addition to sequential 
investment. In such a case, there is in fact a continuum of such equilibria, but one specific 
equilibrium with late joint investment pareto-dominates the others. The existence of such 
equilibria requires some specific properties of the model, typically that the firms are initially 
active in the market so that an investment of the leader has a direct negative effect on the 
follower. This is the case with the adoption of a new technology, which has been studied in the 
industrial organization literature by, e.g., Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). 
Huisman and Kort (2000a) extend the model of Fudenberg and Tirole by introducing 
uncertainty and identify the two possible equilibrium types, namely, the preemption with 
sequential investment and simultaneous (joint) investment. They show that the type of 
equilibrium may depend on the degree of uncertainty. Huisman and Kort (2000b) add 
technological progress by assuming that a superior technology arrives in an exponentially 
distributed random time. The new feature in the solution is a third type of equilibrium that 
appears with some parameter values. In that equilibrium, the firms invest sequentially, but the 
follower is better off than the leader. In such a situation both firms would like the other firm to 
invest first, and thus there are actually two asymmetric equilbria, one for each firm being the 
leader. 
Weeds (2002) presents a similar model, but instead of the adoption of a technology, she 
considers investment in a R&D project, where the time to innovation is random. The first firm to 
succeed in the innovation gets an exclusive right to the project. Two equilibria, a preemptive 
sequential R&D investment and a late simultaneous R&D investment are possible depending 
on the parameter values. The interesting result is that in the latter case, the non-cooperative 
investment is more delayed than the optimal cooperative sequential investment pattern, 
because firms hold back from investing in the fear of starting a patent race. A noteworthy point 
is that in contrast to models of adoption of a new technology, the possibility of simultaneous 
investment equilibrium is not due to initially active firms, but the fact that the proper preemption 
is impossible because of the random time to succeed in the innovation. 
Grenadier (1996) considers real-estate development in duopoly, where both firms have a single 
option to redevelop their properties into superior buildings. Specific features of the model 
include a fixed construction lag and the fact that the development by one firm reduces the value 
of the undeveloped asset of the competitor. If the initial shock value is low, the Markov perfect 
equilibrium is characterized by preemption and sequential development. However, if the shock 
value is initially high, there is an infinite number of equilibria with simultaneous development, 
and the pareto-dominating equilibrium has an interesting property that the development may be 
triggered by a decrease in the shock value. 
Boyer et al. (2001) consider lumpy capacity expansion in duopoly. Consistently with the models 
of technology adoption, also in their model a simultaneous investment may occur only when 
both firms are initially in the market. However, from the viewpoint of modeling the industry 
dynamics, the model is restricted in the sense that even if different initial capacities are 
considered, both firms can expand capacity only once. Article [IV] of this thesis considers the 
full industry dynamics by allowing each firm to have multiple investment opportunities in a 
stochastically growing market. However, numerical analysis is necessary to study the dynamics 
of such a complex setting. 
Some papers consider positive externalities such as network benefits, where an investment of 
a firm has a positive effect on the other firm. Mason and Weeds (2001) consider preemption 
and externalities, and assume that the joint investment gives a higher payoff flow than acting as 
a follower. They distinguish different inefficiencies and study the effect of uncertainty on them: 
due to preemption the leader invests too early, due to the positive (negative) externality on the 
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leader the follower invests too late (too early), and due to the positive externality on each other 
with joint investment the firms invest too often sequentially. Moretto (1996) introduces a 
positive network externality in the adoption of technology assuming that adoption is cheaper for 
the follower than for the leader. The firms have also incomplete information on the investment 
costs of each other. Simultaneous and sequential adoption equilibria may occur depending on 
the parameters. Thijssen et al. (2001) consider information spillovers, and show that either a 
preemption game or a war of attrition may arise depending on the parameterization. 
All of the above mentioned references consider entry, construction of capacity, or adoption of a 
new technology. The strategic interaction in the opposite case, namely abandonment of an 
asset, is considered in the article [V] of this thesis. Without strategic interaction, the decision of 
exit is conceptually similar to entry, but strategic interaction induces a profound difference: 
while interaction in entry takes the form of preemption, in the case of exit it resembles war of 
attrition. In the industrial organization literature such settings are considered in Ghemawat and 
Nalebuff (1985, 1990), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Article [V] shows that the unique 
equilibrium characteristic to deterministic models may break down if the degree of uncertainty 
is high enough. More specifically, in addition to the "normal" equilibrium there may be equilibria 
with strategies that are disconnected "stopping-sets" in the state space. Another recent paper 
that considers strategic interaction in exit from the real options perspective is Lambrecht 
(2001). He focuses on the impact of debt financing on entry and exit, but forces the strategies 
to be connected sets, which ensures a unique equilibrium. 
The literature reviewed above is concerned with discrete projects. Also incremental investment 
has been studied in oligopoly. Williams (1993) develops a model of real estate markets, where 
there is a fixed number of symmetric investors. In that model, the Markov perfect equilibrium is 
characterized by a threshold level in income from developed assets above which all investors 
develop assets at maximum rate, and below which all investors wait. A more general analysis 
is given in Baldursson (1998), where there is a fixed number of firms who can install and shut 
down capacity at given costs. He uses a technique of a fictitious social planner, where the 
problem of finding the Nash equilibrium is converted to the maximization of an artificial 
objective function. However, the technique requires a linear inverse demand function. It is 
shown that qualitatively the price process will be similar in oligopoly and competitive 
equilibrium, although there are positive rents in oligopoly. It is demonstrated numerically that 
initial non-identical capacities converge to each other, but it may take considerable time. 
Also article [VI] of this thesis considers incremental investment in oligopoly under uncertainty. 
However, the methodology is somewhat different from the above mentioned references. The 
model is in discrete time and has its background in dynamic game theory (see Basar and 
Olsder, 1995, for a comprehensive treatment and Haurie et al., 1990, for the information 
structure adopted in [VI]) The focus is rather on computational analysis than on generality. 
Strategic interaction appears on two levels: on output strategies with given fixed capacities, and 
on irreversible investments in new capacity. The model is solved numerically utilizing 
variational inequality and mixed complementarity problem formulations. 
2.5 Applications in energy and resource economics 
Natural resource investments were among the first applications of the real options 
methodology. Brennan and Schwarz (1985) consider opening, closing, and abandonment 
decisions associated with a mine producing a natural resource whose price fluctuates over 
time. Paddock et al. (1988) develop a methodology for the valuation of leases for offshore 
petroleum. Recent applications include Lumley and Zervos (2001), who consider natural 
resource investments in general, and Insley (2002) who considers tree harvesting under mean-
reverting price processes. Conrad (2000) considers the management of a wilderness area, 
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which can be developed, for example for hydropower production. The model has many linked 
options: to preserve, to extract the resources (timber or coal for example) and possibly develop 
later for hydropower, or to develop directly without extracting the resources.  
Optimal policies from the society's perspective are considered in several papers. An adoption 
of an environmental policy, for example, can be seen as an irreversible investment with 
uncertain costs and benefits. The optimal timing to adopt such a policy has been considered by 
Conrad (1997), Saphores and Carr (1999), and Pindyck (2000). The real options methodology 
has also been proposed for assessing other policies. For example, Lund (1992) analyses the 
effects of petroleum tax changes by looking at the behavior of well-diversified value maximizing 
firms. 
Applications in energy investments include on one hand papers that focus on general insights, 
and on the other hand papers that develop methodology for practical use. At the more general 
side, Pindyck (1993a) considers a nuclear power plant investment that takes time to complete. 
He concentrates on uncertainties associated with the cost of construction sorting out two types 
of cost uncertainty. The first is technical uncertainty over the difficulty of completing the project, 
which is only resolved as the construction proceeds, and the second is the uncertainty over the 
prices of construction inputs, which is external and unfolds continuously. He shows that the two 
uncertainties affect investment differently: technical uncertainty makes investment more 
attractive, while input cost uncertainty has the opposite effect. Article [I] in this thesis considers 
another kind of technical uncertainty, namely exogenous technological progress, which takes 
the form of randomly arriving innovations. Motivated by wind power, the model assumes that 
technological innovations reduce the cost of investment. It is shown that the effect of 
technological uncertainty depends on another uncertainty, namely that over the future revenues 
that the plant will generate. 
The choice between alternative production technologies has been studied in several papers. 
Kobila (1990) considers the choice between hydro and thermal power generation under the 
assumption that hydro production has only completely irreversible capital cots, while natural 
gas based production has only variable fuel costs. He studies the socially optimal timing to 
switch from natural gas to hydro in supplying a given demand unit at minimum cost. 
Martzoukos and Teplitz-Smbitzky (1992) consider a related problem of  the optimal timing to 
switch from decentralized diesel power generation to grid-based power supply by 
accomplishing an irreversible transmission line investment. Article [II] of this thesis considers 
the timing of energy investment by a value maximizing investor, when the choice has to be 
made between fossil fuel and biomass fired production technologies. The focus is on the fossil 
fuel price uncertainty and the choice between risky and non-risky projects. Brekke and 
Schieldrop (1999) consider the timing of a power plant investment, when the investor must 
choose either a pure single-fuel plant or a flexible dual-fuel plant. Kulatilaka (1993) is also 
concerned with the valuing of the flexibility to switch between two fuels, but does not consider 
the optimal timing to invest in such a flexible plant. 
Papers that study incremental investment under stochastic demand include Benavides (1995) 
and Kobila (1993). The former models the electricity production capacity investment and 
considers the socially optimal expansion rules in the cases of constant and increasing returns 
to scale. The latter applies stochastic control theory on investment in hydro power capacity 
expansion under the special assumption that the investments in hydro power are optimized by 
a single profit maximizing agent, while there is a competitive supply of thermal power capacity. 
Papers that aim directly at developing methodology for the practical use include Salahor 
(1998), Bradley (1998), Laughton (1998), and Baker et al. (1998), who set general guidelines 
for applying the real options methodology in real cases, and Venetsanos et al. (2002), who 
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propose a methodology for wind power project appraisal under uncertainty. Smith and 
McCardle (1999) describe experiences of using the real options methodology to evaluate some 
real oil and gas investments. 
3 Thesis 
This thesis consists of six individual articles. In this section, the contributions of each article are 
described. To clarify the picture, table 1 classifies them according to the main themes of the 
thesis, that is, investment, uncertainty, and strategic interaction. 
Table 1: Classification of articles 
ARTICLE TYPE OF INVESTMENT SOURCE OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
STRATEGIC 
INTERACTION 
 [I] Single plant Technological progress 
and output price 
No explicit strategic 
interaction 
 [II] Single plant Input price No explicit strategic 
interaction 
 [III] Single project or plant Value of project or plant 
in general 
Oligopoly, preemption 
 [IV] A number of discrete 
projects or plants 
Demand Oligopoly, preemption 
 [V] Shut-down of a single 
firm or plant 
Value of firm or plant in 
general 
Duopoly, war of attrition 
 [VI] Incremental capacity 
investment 
Demand Oligopoly, strategic 
substitutes 
 
[I]  Timing of investment under technological and revenue related 
uncertainties 
Two different uncertainties relate to the investments in developing energy technologies, such 
as wind power production. First, the revenue stream that the investment would generate 
evolves unpredictably in time. Second, there is uncertainty over the future technological 
progress, which determines the cost of investment. There is a conceptual difference between 
the two uncertainties. Namely, technological innovations that arrive randomly only increase the 
value of an investment, while revenue is subject to both positive and negative random 
fluctuations. 
Article [I] considers the effects of these two types of uncertainties on the timing of investment. 
First, their distinction is characterized in the optimal stopping framework. The starting point is 
an investment opportunity that is contingent on a number of stochastic factors. The uncertainty 
in technological progress is characterized by the fact that the associated stochastic process is 
non-decreasing. It is shown that if the value of the investment opportunity is affected only by 
non-decreasing processes, then the optimal investment rule gets an intuitive form, where the 
investment is carried out at a moment when the opportunity cost of delaying the project equals 
the expected change in its net present value. 
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Then, a more specific model motivated by wind power investments with both types of 
uncertainties is presented. The technological progress is modeled as a Poisson arrival process, 
where innovations that reduce the cost of investment arrive at random times. The revenue 
stream that the investment would generate follows a geometric Brownian motion. The investor 
observes these two processes, and considers when the investment cost is low enough and 
revenue stream is high enough to carry out the investment. It is shown that the optimal 
investment rule is to invest when the ratio of the output price to the investment cost exceeds a 
certain threshold level. 
The uncertainty in the technological progress gives rise to some interesting findings. In the 
absence of revenue uncertainty, the technological uncertainty as such does not matter. The 
investor can act as if the actual stochastic process for the investment cost were replaced by its 
expected path. However, when the revenue uncertainty is added in the model, the 
technological uncertainty starts to matter as well. Namely, keeping the expected path of the 
investment cost fixed, the higher the uncertainty in the process, the more reluctant the investor 
is to invest. It is perhaps against common intuition that the effect of technological uncertainty 
depends crucially on whether the revenue stream is deterministic or stochastic. 
The extension of the article to the previous literature is the inclusion of the technological 
uncertainty in an otherwise standard real options model. Technological uncertainty has been 
considered in several papers (e.g. Grenadier and Weiss, 1997, Farzin et al. 1998), but the new 
feature is the interaction of the two types of uncertainties. Even if motivated by wind power 
investments, the results are applicable more generally. Possible applications include the 
development and market introduction of a new product and adoption of a new technology in 
different contexts. 
[II]  Input price risk and optimal timing of energy investment: choice 
between fossil- and biofuels 
A characteristic feature of heat and power production is that there are many alternative 
technologies available. Different technologies have different properties in terms of the cost 
structure and associated uncertainties. Concerning production costs, there are significant 
differences in the uncertainties associated with prices of alternative fuel types. Natural gas, for 
example, being typically an export product with few sources of supply, is subject to 
considerable price fluctuations, while biomass is typically domestically produced, and its price 
is based on such factors as the costs of growing, harvesting, and transporting. Nevertheless, in 
the literature the comparisons of the total production costs using different technologies are 
typically carried out using fixed estimates for the fuel prices. 
Article [II] takes a dynamic perspective on the competitiveness of alternative production 
technologies. It is pointed out that the irreversibility in the choice of technology combined with 
uncertainties in the input prices have important implications on the optimal investment 
behavior. This is done by looking at a representative investor who is considering an energy 
production investment, and faces the choice between fossil fuel and biomass fired plants. To 
make the point as clear as possible, the fossil fuel price is assumed stochastic, while the 
biomass price is constant. The investment creates a given payoff stream, either as an explicit 
revenue from selling the output, or as a flow of avoided cost of purchasing the demanded 
energy service from elsewhere. It is assumed that the investment can be delayed without 
constraints, thus both the timing and the type of the plant must be chosen. 
The optimal investment behavior is driven by the stochastic fossil fuel price development. The 
solution consists of two threshold levels that trigger an investment: if the fossil fuel price falls to 
the lower threshold it becomes optimal to invest in the fossil fueled plant while at the higher 
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threshold it becomes optimal to invest in the biomass fired plant. Between the thresholds it is 
optimal to wait. 
The results indicate that as the choice of technology is irreversible, it is optimal to postpone the 
investment at a wide range of prices even if it would otherwise be optimal to invest in one or 
both of the plant types. This means that the fuel price uncertainty associated with one plant 
type may postpone investments in other plant types as well if the technologies are alternatives 
to each other and the choice of technology is irreversible. The result is due to the flexibility 
inherent in the real option that allows the choice between the two technologies. This increases 
the value of the option, and because the investor has to give this option up at the moment of 
investment, it induces additional reluctance to invest. Even in the case where biomass plant is 
chosen, the investment is triggered by the fossil fuel price development, because the two 
alternatives are interrelated through the real option. 
A numerical example is given based on rough cost estimates of two types of power plants 
applicable in Finland. It is demonstrated that increased input price volatility widens the waiting 
range, while increased value of the low-risk biomass project reduces it. 
Even if the article is restricted to a specific setting, the general idea can be seen from a broader 
perspective by noting that a similar irreversibility associated with the choice between different 
actions may appear in other context. An example could be the optimal choice and timing of an 
environmental policy. If there are uncertainties specific to different policies, then this may 
induce a value of waiting for further information delaying the optimal timing to implement the 
policy. 
[III]  A game model of irreversible investment under uncertainty 
Some investment projects are exclusive in the sense that even if the opportunity is available to 
many firms, only one can take the project. Once one of the firms invests, the opportunity is lost 
for the other firms. An example of such a situation could be the opportunity to build a natural 
gas or electricity network to connect two price regions in international energy markets. There is 
a rent associated with such an opportunity, which would be fully realized by waiting until the 
present value of the project exceeds the cost of investment by the value of the investment 
option. However, since only one investor gets the project, the rent is subject to competitive 
interaction. In the case of preemptive competition, it is even possible that the rent is completely 
dissipated. 
Article [III] considers a setting where there is a single investment opportunity and a number of 
non-cooperative firms who can invest in it. It is assumed that the present value of the project to 
each individual firm follows a geometric Brownian motion. The uncertainty can be firm specific 
or common to all firms. This is modeled by allowing the value to be a separate process for each 
firm, and letting the processes be correlated to an arbitrary degree. If the processes are non-
correlated, uncertainty is completely firm specific, and if they are perfectly correlated, 
uncertainty is industry-wide. Different assumptions on the symmetry properties and information 
that the firms have about each other's project values are considered. 
When the firms have constantly perfect information on the project values of each other, the 
equilibrium is simple. In the special case where the firms are symmetric and the uncertainty is 
industry-wide so that each firm has the same present value for the project, the rent is fully 
dissipated by the preemption. As soon as the present value of the project reaches the cost of 
investment, one of the firms invests. All firms are indifferent between investing and not 
investing, but if all firms would wait until the present value would rise above that level there 
would be a positive rent available and it would be profitable for any of the firms to preempt the 
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others. If the firms are asymmetric, for example so that one firm has a lower investment cost 
than the others, the "best firm" gets a positive rent, because it can wait until preemption 
becomes attractive for the "second best" firm. Finally, if the uncertainty is at least to some 
extent firm specific, then there is a positive rent for each firm. There is some probability that the 
project value exceeds the cost of investment for any firm before the others. In such a case, the 
lucky firm can wait until the same happens for some other firm without fearing preemption. 
If the firms do not know each other's valuation for the project, then an additional assumption is 
adopted to describe their expectations of their rivals' actions. The firms are assumed to use a 
hazard rate to model the likelihood that their competitors invest within the next short time 
interval. The firms understand that the probability that a competitor invests depends on its 
strategy, and thus the hazard rates are functions of the competitor's strategies. Under such an 
assumption, the equilibrium is characterized by a private threshold level for each firm such that 
an investment is undertaken by the firm whose private project value first reaches its own 
threshold level. Even if the exact equilibrium investment threshold levels depend on the 
somewhat arbitrary hazard rate functions, the equilibrium gives a reasonable idea of rational 
behavior under such conditions of incomplete information. The investment threshold for each 
firm is between the case where the present value equals the cost of investment and the case of 
optimal monopoly investment. Thus, the rent is only partly dissipated. 
[IV] Timing of investments in oligopoly under uncertainty: a framework 
for numerical analysis 
The existing literature either considers a single investment project, or incremental divisible 
investment. However, in many cases investments are individual, discrete projects, but with the 
important property that successive projects affect the values of each other. As the industry 
develops, there will be many such projects taken by firms that must account for the strategic 
interaction. An example could be a growing market for energy or telecommunications, where 
the consecutive network investments affect the values of past and future investments. 
The full dynamics of such a setting is difficult to study analytically. Article [IV] proposes a 
general framework for studying it numerically. The market consists of a fixed number of firms 
who produce a homogenous output the demand for which evolves according to a discrete time 
stochastic process. The firms carry out discrete investment projects in order to adjust their 
production cost functions or capacities in response to the growing demand. 
The modeling approach consists of two stages. In the first stage, the Markov perfect Nash 
equilibrium is solved numerically by backward induction. To ensure a unique equilibrium, it is 
assumed that within each period, only one of the firms may act. For this purpose, an extended 
state space is introduced that enables investment turns to be determined randomly. In the 
second stage, the market is simulated by picking samples of the stochastic demand process 
and using the equilibrium strategies to determine the firms' investments. This two-stage 
approach can be seen as an extension of the standard Monte Carlo simulation methods to 
oligopolistic settings. It allows one to make conclusions on how the primary uncertainty in the 
exogenous demand process is transmitted through the strategic interaction to the probability 
distribution of the resulting cash-flows. 
An example of the model is given in a market, where the demand grows slowly in the 
beginning, then goes through a period of strong growth, and eventually stabilizes. This kind of 
dynamics is typical for emerging markets. The three stages of growth are modeled by using 
different parameters in the binomial stochastic process used to describe the demand growth. 
An asymmetric case, where one of the firms must increase capacity in larger lumps than the 
other firm, illustrates the trade-off between the value of flexibility and scale economies under 
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competition. The firm with the possibility to make small investments is more flexible, but the 
firm that makes larger investments is more cost-efficient. The simulation results reveal an 
interesting division of the resulting total payoffs into different groups according to the 
investment patterns that occur along different realizations of the stochastic process. This kind 
of patterns resulting from strategic interaction may have important effects on the statistical 
properties of the firms' payoff distributions. 
[V]  Exit in duopoly under uncertainty 
A decision to shut down a plant or other operations is actually an irreversible investment 
decision. The initial expenditure of the "exit investment" consists typically of severance 
payments to labor and other similar costs, and the expected rewards are the future losses 
avoided by the exit. Therefore, in an industry characterized by uncertainty, it is natural to model 
exit using the same methodology as irreversible investment (e.g. Dixit, 1989a, Alvarez, 1998, 
1999). 
However, strategic interaction induces a profound difference between the decisions of entry 
and exit. When the firms are strategic substitutes, i.e., the profitability of a firm is negatively 
affected by the presence of a competitor, the interaction in entry takes the form of preemption, 
while in exit it resembles war of attrition. The reason is that in a game of entry firms would like 
their competitors to enter as late as possible, whereas in a game of exit firms would like their 
competitors to exit as early as possible.  
Article [V] studies a market with two active firms, where the general profitability in the industry 
is modeled by a state variable that follows a geometric Brownian motion. Since being active in 
the market induces a cost flow, it becomes optimal for the firms to exit if the state variable 
decreases low enough. Once one of the firms exits, the remaining firm enjoys monopoly profits 
until it exits as well. The extension of the model in relation to earlier literature can be seen from 
two perspectives. On one hand, it extends the real options literature to consider strategic 
interaction associated with abandonment options in oligopoly, and on the other hand, it extends 
the industrial organization literature on exit (in particular Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985) to 
include uncertainty. 
Without strategic interaction, the optimal strategy would be simply a threshold level such that it 
is optimal to exit whenever the state variable is below it. However, with strategic interaction, a 
more formal definition of the strategies is essential. In [V], the strategies are defined as 
arbitrary stopping sets in the state space. This implies that the equilibrium must be Markov 
perfect. To allow arbitrary stopping sets is important, because it turns out that there may be 
equilibria with stopping sets of disconnected nature, referred to as "gap equilibria" in the article. 
If the strategies were simply defined as threshold levels, as is typical for preemption models, 
such equilibria could not be detected. 
It is shown that due to the strategic interaction, the value function of the firm that stays in the 
market longer in equilibrium has a kink that corresponds to the exit of its competitor. On the 
other hand, uncertainty has an effect on the strategic interaction: it reduces the payoff 
difference across the firms caused by the asymmetry and strategic interaction. 
However, the most important result is that only when the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently 
low or asymmetry between the firms is sufficiently large, a unique equilibrium exists. In that 
case one of the firms is doomed to exit before the other, because the other firm can credibly 
commit to staying in the market longer in case it is left alone. However, when the degree of 
uncertainty is high enough and asymmetry small enough, then a gap equilibrium, where the exit 
order of the firms is reversed, appears. Then there is no unique equilibrium outcome, and it is 
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no longer possible to predict which of the firms would exit first. This is a new finding, and in 
contrast to the presumption stated in Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) according to which there 
is a unique equilibrium with stochastic demand as long as it changes smoothly. It is also 
interesting to compare the result to Fine and Li (1989). They have a model with many equilibria, 
but they assert that the multiple equilibria result is driven by jumps in the demand process, 
independent of whether the demand process is stochastic or deterministic. In this thesis it is 
shown that multiple equilibria result may be driven by uncertainty even if the demand decline 
path is continuous. 
[VI] An oligopolistic investment model of the Finnish electricity market 
Article [VI] addresses incremental production capacity expansion in an oligopolistic market. For 
the purpose of numerical analysis, a dynamic, stochastic game model is presented and applied 
on a rough representation of the Finnish electricity market. 
An important concept in dynamic game models is the information structure (see Basar and 
Olsder, 1995, for a summary). Whereas the Markov perfect equilibrium in article [IV] is based 
on feedback information structure, the model in article [VI] has a so-called sample-path 
adapted (S-adapted) information structure adopted from Haurie et al. (1990). This information 
structure is similar to the open-loop one, except that the strategies of the players adapt to the 
sample path of the stochastic variable. Using the terminology of extensive form games, the 
corresponding Nash equilibrium is not sub-game perfect. However, it is time-consistent (as a 
normal open-loop equilibrium) in the terminology of dynamic game theory. An example of 
comparison between open-loop and feedback models of dynamic oligopoly is Karp and Perloff 
(1993). 
The source of uncertainty in the model is the demand growth. This is described as an event 
tree, where at each period there are two possible growth rates represented by separate nodes. 
Because there are many periods, these nodes form an event tree, which branches at each 
period resulting in a growing number of nodes per period. A certain path through the tree 
corresponds to a scenario of events. Strategic interaction appears at two levels. Within each 
node, the firms decide both the outputs with given capacities and the investments in new 
production capacity. The output decisions only influence the current period, but the investment 
decisions are irreversible and carry over to the forthcoming periods. 
As shown in Haurie et al. (1990), the S-adapted open-loop equilibrium can be numerically 
solved using stochastic equilibrium programming techniques. This means that in principle the 
computation is not different from computing a static Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Two methods 
were used to solve the model. One of them is to solve directly the first order optimality 
conditions simultaneously for all players. This results in a nonlinear complementarity problem, 
which was solved using GAMS modeling software and MILES solver (see Rutherford, 1993). 
Another method is the diagonalization algorithm, which is based on iterated optimization (see 
Harker, 1984). 
Real data of the main actors in the Finnish electricity market is used to sketch stylized 
scenarios of possible future market structures. Using these scenarios, possible market 
outcomes are analyzed. Sensitivity analysis is carried out on the number of actors in the 
market, on the investment costs, and on demand elasticity. A welfare maximizing competitive 
benchmark solution is also established to isolate the effect of the market power. The main 
result is that the firms can effectively use their market power to rise the price. The investments 
are very limited. Particularly in the case of strong demand growth, high prices result. 
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When considering the relevance of the results, it should be kept in mind that they rest on the 
strong assumption that entry by new firms is not possible. This assumption may not be very 
realistic in all cases, in particular in the long-run. Nevertheless, the results can be seen as an 
cautionary example of the effect of entry barriers. If such barriers exist, the market power 
coupled with uncertain demand growth strongly restrains capacity investments resulting in high 
prices. 
4 Concluding remarks 
This thesis presents six separate articles on investment under uncertainty with the focus on 
strategic interaction and energy market applications. The first two articles consider optimal 
investment in isolation from competition. While [I] focuses on the interaction between different 
uncertainties associated with one investment opportunity, [II] focuses on the irreversibility in the 
choice between alternative investment opportunities with different risk characteristics. The four 
remaining articles include strategic interactions in different forms. While [III] and [IV] consider 
the initiating of discrete projects, [V] considers the abandonment of a project, and [VI] focuses 
on incremental capacity investment. 
The emphasis has been on theoretical development and general insights rather than on 
practical tools. Articles [III], [V], and [VI] are purely descriptive in nature, while [I], [II], and [IV] 
contain also prescriptive elements. In any case, further work aimed at strengthening the links 
with the reality would be important. With descriptive results, this would require linking to 
empirical observations, while with the prescriptive results, more tailored modeling is necessary 
to get applicable tools for the real decision making. For instance, the geometric Brownian 
motion used in many articles of this thesis serves as a convenient characterization of 
uncertainty in general, but in practical applications other stochastic processes would be 
appropriate to capture some characteristics of energy prices, such as seasonality and mean 
reversion. This kind of refinements would also require further development of numerical solving 
methodologies. 
The liberalization of energy markets is a recent trend, and its real implications on capital 
investments will be observed with delay. For example, the Nordic electricity industry was 
characterized by excess capacity before liberalization, and therefore the capital investments 
since the restructuring have been minor. However, as the demand is growing, the surplus in 
capacity is reducing. It is likely that capital investments will in the near future gain increasing 
interest also from the practical point of view, when it will be observed directly how the price 
mechanism signals the scarcity of supply to investment decisions of the market participants. 
Meanwhile, it is important to develop appropriate methodologies for the understanding and 
analyzing of the firms' investment behavior. 
Concerning the theoretical contributions of this thesis, the main effort has been on the 
incorporation of strategic interaction with the real options methodology. As reviewed in section 
2.4, this is currently an active area of research. However, this line of work can also be seen 
from another perspective, namely as an extension of the theory of industrial organization to 
incorporate uncertainty. Since most industries are in reality characterized by uncertainties, this 
extension towards the direction that views market stability as one of the factors explaining 
rational behavior of the firms is important. An example of such an extension is the article [V] of 
this thesis, which shows that the degree of uncertainty may determine whether a particular 
pattern of exit from a declining market is supported by a unique equilibrium. 
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